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As international trade between China and the United 
States has increased markedly in recent years, negotiation 
behavior between Chinese and Americans has become a timely 
issue. Most research conducted in this area discusses the 
fundamental cultural differences between East and West, as 
well as the difficulties Westerners have in negotiating with 
the Chinese. Little was written on the actual negotiation 
behavior itself. 
This paper is focused on the negotiation behavior 
between Chinese and American business people. Following a 
review of relevant research, the author found that both 
Confucian philosophy and Taoistic philosophy continue to 
provide the foundations of Chinese cultural traditions and 
values, which influence Chinese perceptions and approaches 
to conflict resolution and thus affect Chinese negotiation 
behavior. Cultural values discussed include harmony, 
collectivism, conformity, holism-contextualism, time, face, 
shame, reciprocity, high context, friendship, and Guanxi. 
The author suggests that traditional Chinese cultural values 
vi 
influence Chinese people to be less openly assertive and 
emotional in conflict situations, which consequently lead 
Chinese negotiators to the adoption of high compromising and 
avoiding behaviors and a relatively low preference for 
competing and assertive postures in negotiations. 
Based on the cultural values and Chinese conflict 
preferences, the author offers recommendations for 
preparing, conducting, and concluding negotiations with 
Chinese people. 
vii 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I became interested in the negotiation behavior of 
different cultures in 1988 when I was a graduate student at 
Xi'an Foreign Languages University, People's Republic of 
China, and was once invited to work as an interpreter for an 
American international bank intending to make some 
investments in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, P.R.C. 
During the ten days of working as an interpreter, I 
noticed some subtle differences of negotiation styles 
between the Chinese local officials and the American bank 
officials. For example, while the American bank officials 
wanted to get down quickly to key issues such as choosing 
the site of the factory, the estimated total cost, the 
contribution of money to the joint venture by each side, and 
the dividends of future benefits, the Chinese local 
officials were not -in a hurry to do so. They were more 
interested in the socializing activities such as taking the 
American guests sightseeing, or showing them local special 
products and foods. 
When the actual negotiation meetings began, the 
1 
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Americans did most of the talking and argued firmly for 
their positions, while the Chinese sat there quietly most of 
the time, responding now and then, yet firmly holding their 
ground. The negotiation of the joint venture ended in 
failure. The American bank officials left without signing 
any contract. I regretted this conclusion for a long time, 
and ever since then, I have kept asking myself the questions 
"Why would two parties with good intentions to do business 
with each other fail? What could be done to prevent the 
failures? 
My enthusiasm in studying negotiation behavior between 
Chinese and American business people began in 1993 when I 
started my graduate program in the Department of 
Communication and Broadcasting, Western Kentucky University. 
After taking courses such as intercultural communication, 
foundations of communication and nonverbal communication, I 
came to realize the importance of cultural factors in 
influencing intercultural business negotiation outcomes. 
Thus began my two years of research in the field of business 
negotiations between Chinese and American business people. 
Objective of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to understand the effects 
of culture on the negotiation process--specifically, the 
3 
effects of Chinese culture on the negotiation behavior of 
the Chinese. According to Fisher and Ury, negotiation "is a 
basic means of getting what you want from others" (Fisher 
and Ury, 1981, p. 2). Unterman sees negotiation as "a 
process wherein two or more people get together for the 
purpose of changing each other's values and behaviors" 
(Unterman, 1985, p. 51). Nierenberg believes that "whenever 
people exchange ideas with the intention of changing 
relationships, whenever they confer for agreement, they are 
negotiating (Nierenberg, 1988, p. 37). 
Culture has been defined as "the symbolic-expressive 
aspect of human behavior" and "the totality of man's 
products" (Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurweil, 1984, p. 
35). Harris and Moran define culture as "the way of living 
developed and transmitted by a group of human beings, 
consciously or unconsciously to subsequent generations" 
(Harris and Moran, 1991, p. 135). To Cohen, culture is 
"fundamentally a property of information, a grammar for 
organizing reality, for importing meaning to the world" 
(Cohen, 1991, p. 10). Mazrui believes culture has four 
dimensions which create the social whole: the kinship 
culture, the intellectual culture, the economic culture, and 
the political culture. Mazrui holds: 
The kinship culture is concerned with the issue of 
descent, marriage, succession, and kinship 
loyalties, obligations and entitlement. The 
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intellectual culture is that part of the system 
which provides the framework of reasoning, the 
pre-suppositions of inference and deduction, the 
basic ideas of intellectual discourse and the 
boundaries of analytical and abstract thought. 
Economic culture defines the means of production 
and livelihood in society, the techniques of 
exchange, and the values and norms underlying and 
motivating economic behavior. Political culture 
means the values, prejudices, inhibition, and 
ideas. The ideas condition political behavior in 
a given society. Also, it helps to determine the 
nature of political institutions and the direction 
of political change. (Mazrui, 1976, pp. 75-76). 
Mentioned above are various definitions of culture and 
negotiation. In fact, culture and negotiation are closely 
related. Culture plays a very important part in business 
transaction and in negotiation. This study is concentrated 
on negotiations between Chinese and American business 
people. Specifically, it focuses on the influence of 
Chinese cultural factors on Chinese conflict management 
preferences and subsequent negotiating and bargaining 
behavior. 
In recent years there have been a number of suggestive 
applications of the intercultural communication approach to 
the field of international business negotiation. One 
application has taken the detailed, historical case study. 
Jim Mann (1989) examines business negotiations between 
American Motors Corporation and Beijing Jeep in the 1980s 
and concludes that cultural and bureaucratic obstacles are 
major difficulties for Westerners in doing business in 
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China. However, respecting each other's cultural traditions 
and values and compromising each other's stands or positions 
may serve as remedy for Sino-American business practices. 
A second approach to culture and negotiation focuses 
not so much on the bilateral chemistry of a negotiation as 
on national negotiation styles taken as subjects of 
investigation in their own right. Michael Blaker (1990) 
published a useful historical study of Japanese negotiation 
behavior in the twentieth century. Lucian Pye's (1982) more 
conceptual account of Chinese commercial negotiation style, 
although brief, provides particular enlightenment given the 
author's practical experience as advisor to U.S. government 
officials negotiating with the Chinese. Originally 
published by Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Main, Pye's book has 
become a classic book on Chinese commercial negotiation 
style. 
Approaching from different perspectives, both Jim 
Mann's detailed, historical study of business negotiations 
between Chinese and American business people and Lucian 
Pye's more conceptual account of Chinese commercial style 
have enriched my knowledge of Sino-American business 
negotiations. In fact, Mann's detailed case study of 
business negotiations between American Motors Corporation 
and Beijing Jeep has provided me the basic knowledge of what 
is really going on between Chinese and American business 
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negotiations, while Lucian Pye's study has provided me more 
general and conceptual knowledge of Sino-American 
negotiation styles. 
A third approach to culture and negotiation is provided 
by Glen Fisher (1980), a former foreign service officer with 
a background in social anthropology and sociology. According 
to Fisher, different values, mannerism, forms of verbal and 
nonverbal behavior, and notions of status may block 
confidence and impede communication. Fisher believes 
culture impinges on negotiation in four crucial ways: by 
conditioning one's perception of reality, by blocking out 
information inconsistent or unfamiliar with cultural 
grounded assumptions, by projecting meaning onto the other-
party's words and actions, and by possibly impelling the 
ethnocentric observer to an incorrect attribution of motive. 
Fisher's work provides the first attempt to construct a 
systematic theoretical introduction to negotiation and 
culture. 
Each of these three approaches to culture and 
negotiation has its merits and limitations. The first 
approach, the detailed, historical case study, provides us 
practical experience on international business negotiation 
by focusing on the bilateral chemistry of the negotiation. 
It fails, however, to provide the theoretical grounds for 
the analysis of the case study. 
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The second approach, the national negotiation styles, 
offers a general overview of a nation's negotiation styles. 
Yet, its limitation lies in its static, one-sided nature 
compared with bilateral case studies. It tends to overlook 
the fact that negotiation is a game for more than one 
player. 
The third approach, the systematic theoretical approach 
to international negotiation has its strong merits by 
offering comparisons and contrasts about different cultural 
assumptions and values which result in different negotiation 
patterns. Although it fails to provide a real-life case of 
negotiation practice, its systematic theories have prepared 
a solid background for understanding the different 
negotiation styles. 
In this study I integrate elements of the case study, 
national negotiation style, and the conceptual theoretical 
approaches described above to form a new comprehensive 
approach. Although I have not incorporated a real-life case 
study, I have based my analysis on other people's 
observation and experience in Sino-American negotiations as 
well as on my own. Further, I have tried to read as many 
books and journal articles about Chinese and American 
negotiation styles as possible and have incorporated them 
into my study. As for the conceptual frame of process model 
of negotiation, I have examined many other models of 
negotiation, and developed one of my own: exploration, 
solution building, expectation and finalizing. Also, I have 
selected, among all other various Chinese traditional 
values, nine dominant Chinese cultural values which I 
consider very important towards understanding Chinese 
negotiation behavior. I have adopted the Thomas Model of 
Conflict-Management Styles and have applied it to the study 
of Chinese conflict-management preferences. 
The assumptions I have made about Chinese conflict-
management preferences and subsequent negotiation behaviors 
may cause controversial reactions. Nevertheless, it is my 
hope that by approaching the study of Chinese negotiation 
behavior from a new perspective—discussing the Chinese 
negotiation behavior through studying Chinese conflict 
management preferences--! may contribute some new insight to 
the study of Sino-American business negotiation. 
Need for the study 
Arnold Toynbee (Brunner & Wang, 1988, p. 27) strongly 
maintains that the 21st century probably belongs to China. 
Ever since the implementation of China's open-door policy in 
1978, China has become the center of world-wide attention. 
China's rich natural resources and vast market potential 
offer bright prospects for international trade, commerce, 
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and industry. More and more foreign companies come to China 
to trade and to make joint ventures. In recent years the 
international trade between China and the United States has 
increased markedly. China has become one of the major 
market places for America. More American companies come to 
China to negotiate and to engage in joint ventures. Yet, 
because of the sharply different backgrounds and sharply 
different cultures, not ail negotiations result in success. 
Many of them break down because of a variety of 
misunderstandings, and misbehavior, thus making differences 
in negotiation behavior a timely issue. 
Among other factors, effective negotiation depends on 
understanding the other side's negotiation practices. 
Conduct during negotiation is influenced by attitudes, 
customs, and values, which to a great extent lie deeply in a 
negotiating team's cultural and social traits. Different 
attitudes, customs, and values can yield significant 
differences in psychological processes such as selective 
perception and interpersonal attraction, which in turn have 
great impact on the eventual outcome of negotiation. 
Trading between the Chinese and Americans involves 
several major obstacles. First, the Chinese culture and 
American culture diverge widely in the perceptions of time, 
individual, society, and interrelationships, which produce 
significantly different attitudes and behavior. For 
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example, the Chinese perceive law and the nature of legal 
systems much differently than the Americans commonly do. 
Extrapolated to the interpersonal level, these differences 
create a challenge that American negotiators—individual or 
team--must address when dealing with their Chinese 
counterparts. 
Second, the different values, beliefs and orientations 
of Chinese people have a significant bearing upon Chinese 
perceptions and approaches to conflict and lead to 
particular preferences with respect to conflict management 
styles. Lack of understanding of the Chinese conflict 
management styles usually leads ro misunderstanding between 
the two parties, and may sometimes even result in the 
failure of negotiations. 
This writer endeavors to provide negotiators--
particularly Americans--with a rudimentary understanding of 
Chinese cultural factors which influence Chinese conflict 
resolution preferences and negotiation behavior. Evidence 
suggests that these cultural factors significantly affect 
the success or failure of Sino-American negotiations. Pye 
(1982), after interviewing U.S. managers who have negotiated 
with the Chinese, concludes that "unquestionably the largest 
and possibly the most intractable category of problems in 
Sino-American business negotiations can be traced to the 
cultural differences between the two countries" (p. 20). 
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Another study of American firms that had negotiations with 
the Chinese people found that most of these companies 
perceived major differences in negotiation styles (Tung, 
1982, p. 57). 
According to my familiarity with Chinese business 
practices, social customs and interpersonal relationships 
will lead to successful international business negotiations. 
Factors which lead to failures of international business 
negotiation usually include communication breakdown, 
differences in business practices and negotiation style, and 
differences in social customs, culture, and ideology. For 
example, Chinese people like to do business with old 
friends. Thus, interpersonal relationship forms a very 
important factor in doing business with the Chinese. Also, 
Chinese people put much emphasis on the notion of "face": 
the "loss of face" or "not giving face" will cause disgrace 
on the Chinese side. Consequently, "giving face" to the 
Chinese and not causing them to "lose face" becomes very 
important in Sino-American business negotiation. 
Following a brief review of the literature of 
negotiations between Chinese and American business people, I 
will discuss extensively the influence of Chinese cultural 
factors on the development of Chinese psyche, on Chinese 
conflict-management preferences, and on Chinese negotiation 
behavior. 
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Value of this Study 
Among studies of negotiation behavior conducted in the 
United States, little has been written on marketing 
negotiation behaviors between Chinese and Americans. While 
there is no lack of anecdotal and descriptive evidence 
confirming East/West differences and difficulties Westerners 
have in negotiating with the Chinese, little research exists 
documenting the actual negotiation behavior itself. 
This study is focused on the negotiation behavior 
between Chinese and American business people. Specifically, 
I discuss the cultural influences on the Chinese 
psychologies and the Chinese conflict management preferences 
in negotiations. What can be learned from the experiences 
of business should be of value for government-to-government. 
negotiations, given the substantial differences between 
commercial and diplomatic relationships. 
At present, both Beijing and Washington wish to put 
their adversarial competition behind them and seek a more 
cooperative and complementary relationship. Thus, if 
Americans can better understand the Chinese style of 
negotiating in the commercial realm, they may avoid 
misunderstandings and achieve desired goals in the political 
realm. Thus, this writer aims to provide American 
negotiators a better chance to understand the Chinese 
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negotiation behavior, which will lead to a greater 
opportunity to succeed in negotiating with Chinese people--
a benefit to both countries involved. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
International trade between China and the United States 
began in 1978 just after the normalization of Sino-American 
relations. For the first time in history, the U.S.-China 
trade negotiation became a popular topic. Many books were 
written on Chinese cultures, the East-West differences, and 
the difficulties Westerners have in negotiating in China. 
Among the early research, Harris and Moren (1979) 
offered new insight into the Chinese perception of dignity 
as well as Chinese pride psychology. In their classic book, 
Managing Cultural Differences, they pointed out that the 
Chinese have always held themselves in high esteem. The 
name of China translates as "middle kingdom," for the 
Chinese saw themselves, their country, and their culture as 
the center of human civilization( Harris and Moran, 1979, 
p.393) The Chinese expected that all other peoples and 
nations would pay tribute and homage to them. The situation 
continued until modern times, when the Chinese met head on 
with Europeans and Americans who did not understand this 
attitude nor accept it as a condition for working and doing 
14 
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business with them. Thus, problems occurred in 
international trade. As a solution to these problems, 
Harris and Moran (1979) suggested proper etiquette, personal 
touch, dignity, reserve, patience, persistence, and a 
sensitivity to and respect for Chinese customs and 
temperament in negotiating with Chinese business people. 
Similar to Harris and Moran's study of the Chinese 
concept of dignity is Brunner and Wang's (1989) study of 
Chinese concept of "face." According to Brunner and Wang, 
the Chinese "face behavior" involves two sets of criteria by 
which prestige is gained and one's status in society is 
enhanced or attained. Two words distinguish these criteria, 
both of which mean "face." "Lien" refers to society's 
respect for an individual with a good moral reputation, 
thereby perceiving him as one who fulfills his 
responsibilities, regardless of the efforts and consequences 
involved, and demonstrates decency as a human being. 
The other concept, "mien-tzu," refers to the attainment 
of an achieved status by working hard, negotiating with 
skill, working well with others, and effectively applying 
knowledge and personal judgement. Nonpersonal factors, such 
as authority, social status and wealth, also contribute to 
mien-tzu. 
In practice, as Brunner and Wang point out, the Chinese 
emphasize that one should not only protect one's own face 
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(lien) but also extend face (mien-tzu) to others, which is 
of equal importance. 
In terms of negotiations, face is a reciprocal 
relationship, implying respect and deference which each 
negotiating party expects from the other, and, which in 
turn, is extended to the other person. Foreigners involved 
m negotiations with the Chinese must be cognizant of the 
patterns of face behavior, endeavoring to "give face" to 
the Chinese, and avoiding actions which will cause them to 
"lose face." To do otherwise is to ignore the importance of 
the face behavior, its pervasiveness in social interaction 
and its role in successful negotiating with the Chinese (p. 
44) . 
Shenky and Ronen (1987) conducted another study on 
Chinese interpersonal norms which exert great influence in 
Chinese negotiation behavior. They found that Confucian 
philosophy continues to provide the foundation of Chinese 
cultural traditions and values, with the tenants of harmony, 
development of one's moral potential, and kinship 
affiliation having relevance for interpersonal behavior. 
The Chinese preference for harmony and developing one's 
moral potential suggests that American negotiators should 
avoid overtly aggressive behavior in negotiations. The 
American task-oriented approach, which allows for the 
admission of differences in the positions of the parties to 
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a negotiation so as to promote "honest confrontation," is 
viewed by the Chinese as an aggressive and is therefore an 
unacceptable mode of behavior. Thus, emotionally charged 
attempts at persuasion remain likely to fail when directed 
at the Chinese, and negotiators should consider other modes 
of persuasion. Also, the Chinese preference for kinship 
affiliation indicates that American negotiators should take 
a long-range view and enter negotiations even when they can 
not determine immediate returns. Similarly, during 
negotiations, American firms may find it worthwhile to forgo 
some advantages for the sake of establishing a long-lasting 
mutual attraction. 
In terms of nonverbal communications, Shenker and Ronen 
point out that Americans negotiating with the Chinese must 
learn not to interpret silence or the lack of direct eye 
contact as either simple disapproval or disinterest, nor 
should they necessarily respond to such behavior by making 
additional concessions. American negotiators should act 
patiently in negotiations and should suggest brief recesses 
more frequently so that, upon reaching an apparent impasse, 
the negotiating parties may make decisions in private. 
Pye (1982), professor of political science at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conducted several 
studies on negotiations between Chinese and American 
business people. Pye, a specialist on Asian affairs, and an 
18 
advisor to U.S. government officials negotiating with the 
Chinese, conducted his research on the experiences of 
American and Japanese business negotiators which led to his 
book Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style, a classic book in 
the field of negotiating with China. 
Pye thoroughly studied the sources of difficulties 
between the negotiation teams of the two countries, the 
ambience of negotiation, the opening moves, the substantive 
negotiating session, and the emotional basis for the Chinese 
negotiating style. According to Pye, the general sources of 
difficulty arise from three areas: (1), the newness of the 
relations and lack of experience on both sides, (2), 
problems inherent in capitalist enterprises seeking to do 
business with a centrally planned, socialist economy, and 
(3), the cultural characteristics of both Chinese and 
American--namely, the different concepts of friendship and 
law. 
In terms of the emotional basis for the Chinese 
negotiating style, Pye indicates that the blending of 
xenophobia and xenophila in the Chinese psychology explains 
some of the strong behaviors of the Chinese negotiators who, 
at one moment, may seem carried away with enthusiasm for the 
novelty of foreign products, but then suddenly turn 
defensive as they feel the need to assert Chinese 
superiority. Pye suggests that Americans take great care 
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not to hurt the Chinese pride and remain alert to the 
meanings behind their actions. Finally, Pye recommended 
staying patient and steadfast, preventing exaggerated 
expectations, considering seriously the general principles 
of relationship, and mastering the record of previous 
negotiations as techniques in negotiating with the Chinese. 
In "The China Trade: Making the Deal," Pye (1986) 
discusses in great detail the differing negotiation styles, 
concepts of things, and attitudes towards work between 
Chinese and American negotiators. According to Pye, the 
Chinese are more restrained and more passive in 
negotiations. They simply ask questions and probe for 
information, concealing any eagerness they may feel. They 
are wary of showing enthusiasm--an attitude that contrasts 
sharply with the American salesperson's excitement at the 
mere prospect of a deal. Pye describes the Chinese as quick 
to talk about friendship and ready on short acquaintance to 
call them "old friend." "What may seem to Americans as mere 
conviviality is to the Chinese an essential negotiation 
element" (p. 78). The Chinese can make heavy demands on 
friends and place few limits on how they use friendship to 
material advantage, while the Americans see friendship as 
built on a natural give-and-take. 
In this study Pye pointed out that the Chinese and the 
Americans have different concepts of reaching agreements. 
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Americans believe that it follows a process of give-and-take 
that culminates when both sides have maximized their 
position while the Chinese negotiators see an agreement more 
as a pledge from both sides. They believe a bond is sealed 
from the point where each side works out the benefits it 
will receive. At the conclusion of the study, Pye again 
suggested patience and courtesy as remedy in negotiation 
with the Chinese executives. 
Lubman (1983) conducted a study based on a decade of 
participation in commercial negotiations with Chinese. From 
the perspective of a lawyer, Lubman identified some of the 
problems Westerners encounter in commercial negotiations in 
China and isolated certain unique characteristics of the 
negotiations. According to Lubman, the differences between 
Chinese and Westerners in commercial negotiation exist at 
the most obvious levels, such as the inability of each side 
to speak the other's language or to grasp the subtleties of 
etiquette that each culture expects. Less obvious, but 
perhaps more significant, disparities may occur in the 
perception of the nature and implications of basic concepts 
so that the two sides often appear to be talking at, rather 
than with, each other. 
A specific illustration of such differences over 
fundamental legal concepts appear in negotiations over 
guarantees in licensing agreements. According to Lubman, 
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the language of guarantees to which the Chinese rigidly 
insist the licensor agree is general and uncertain while 
Americans demand specificity. Moreover, Lubman pointed out 
that the Chinese and Americans have different concepts of 
the negotiation contract. While the Chinese view the 
contract as a commercial document which defines the desired 
outcome of the transaction, Westerners view the contract as 
a legal document which defines the responsibilities of 
parties to each other and to third parties and the 
consequent rights that each party enjoys. Thus, the draft 
contract suggested by the American side tends toward great 
complexity and the revised contract suggested by the Chinese 
side tends toward simplicity. The lack of common conceptual 
ground causes delays in negotiations. Lubman suggests that 
before the U.S. businessmen and lawyers come to China to 
negotiate, they should inform themselves about the basic 
negotiation concepts as well as Chinese bureaucracy to avoid 
delays and misunderstanding in negotiations. 
Davidson (1987) recommends some solutions in managing 
Sino-American commercial negotiations. Before going to the 
negotiation table, Davidson suggests that American firms 
should prepare an initial written agreement of a set of 
goals which provide a sound starting point for the 
negotiation process. The American team should also acquire 
a translator familiar both with China and the business in 
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question. Davidson also advises that the American team 
should know the negotiators and the authorities and how they 
fit into the scheme of approval. An understanding and 
appreciation of the approval process is vital to each 
potential tension at the negotiation table. Further, in 
order to avoid future problems and conflicts, Davidson 
suggests that the foreign investors should consider as many 
potential problems as possible and prepare written 
procedures to solve them. Many American firms already in 
China offer "write it down" as their first bit of advice. 
Frankenstein (1986) conducted a survey among 26 
American business people to determine which issues were the 
most difficult to solve in negotiating with the Chinese. He 
names the following issues in rank order: price, technology 
protection, valuation of capital contributions for joint 
ventures, training for Chinese personal, delivery schedules, 
penalty clauses, warranty protection, and determining 
technical specifications. Price comes as the first most 
difficult issue because "price is uppermost in the minds of 
Chinese negotiators" (Frankenstein, 1986, p. 151). 
One reason for the difficulty of the price issue, 
according to Frankenstein, is that the Chinese bureaucrats 
and managers want to make the best deal they can. The 
political and career consequences for not doing so can be 
serious. Further, Chinese enterprises, under the Deng 
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regime's economic reform package, are now responsible for 
both profit and loss and can retain portions of profit for 
their own use. Indeed, Chinese enterprises are under 
considerable pressure to improve what the Chinese 
authorities call "economic results." 
As for other issues, most of them are caused by the 
lack of experience in doing business with each other as well 
as different conceptions about doing business. Frankenstein 
finally recommends that American business people use caution 
in dealing with these issues with the Chinese negotiators. 
Campbell and Adlington (1988) conducted another survey 
concerning the speed and ease in Sino-American negotiations. 
Their study indicates that negotiating with the Chinese 
tends to be slow compared to other developing countries. 
However, negotiations in China have become much faster now 
than previously. The Chinese have become much quicker and 
more practical at negotiating contracts. Further, Campbell 
and Adlington found the following factors make negotiation 
in China go faster: (1) the project is compatible with 
central government development priorities; (2) the project 
is compatible with municipal and /or district priorities; 
(3) there are few Chinese organizations involved; (4) a 
trading relationship already exists between the Chinese and 
the foreign firm; (5) the complexity of the technology is 
low; (6) the Chinese negotiators have previous experience 
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negotiating with foreign companies and understand Western 
business concepts; (7) the composition of the Chinese 
negotiation team remains stable throughout the proceeding; 
(8) the foreign company stresses mutual benefit for both 
sides; and (9) the foreign company remains flexible and 
creative during negotiations, rather than legalistic and 
rigid. 
Among other studies, Graham, Kim, and Robinson (1988) 
together conducted a laboratory simulation on buyer-seller 
negotiations among 138 Americans, 54 Chinese, 42 Japanese, 
and 38 Koreans. The finding of the simulation indicates 
that in negotiations between Americans, the use of more task 
oriented, problem-solving approach positively influences 
negotiation outcomes. In negotiations between Chinese, more 
competitive strategies led to better results. In Japanese 
and Korean negotiations, buyers achieved higher economic 
rewards than sellers. In all four cultures, bargainers were 
more satisfied with negotiation outcomes when partners were 
rated as more interpersonally attractive. 
Furthermore, the findings of the simulation indicate 
that the behavior of Chinese negotiators is "generally 
honest," very price conscious, and very competitive. 
Chinese initially ask for a lot, make group decisions from 
the top down, and let age and status affect negotiation 
outcomes. Graham, Kim, and Robinson also found that buyer-
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seller negotiation data for the Chinese group differed from 
the American model of buyer-seller negotiation. Problem-
solving bargaining strategies had a direct and negative 
effect on the Chinese group's profit. Chinese negotiators 
who used more competitive strategies did better in the 
buyer-seller simulation. 
Adler, Brahm, and Graham (1992) offered a recent study 
on Sino-America negotiations. Based also on a laboratory 
simulation, they examined the face-to-face buyer-seller 
negotiation process. They indicated that a problem-solving 
approach was helpful for both the Chinese and the American 
negotiators. Such an approach, emphasizing the exchange of 
information, appears to have facilitated partner 
satisfaction. Also, negotiator problem-solving strategies 
apparently encouraged partners to reciprocate with problem-
solving behaviors, which, in turn, increased the 
negotiators' own profits. The authors suggest that when the 
Chinese negotiators were positively attracted to partners, 
they were also more satisfied with negotiation outcomes. 
In addition, they point out that the Chinese bargainers 
tended to ask many more questions and to interrupt one 
another more frequently than their American counterparts. 
Such subtle differences in style, according to them, may 
cause problems in Sino-American negotiation, which, in turn, 
sour otherwise fruitful commercial alliances. 
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Among other recent studies, Hellweg, Samovar and Skow 
(1993) have offered a comparative study on cultural 
variations in negotiation style. They point out that 
Americans differ from the Chinese and other cultures in 
three large aspects in negotiation: (1) rules for conducting 
business, (2) the selection of negotiators, and (3) methods 
of decision-making. According to the authors, American 
negotiators assume an attitude of "economic gain" in the 
negotiation process. They expect others to display what 
they conceive of as "American professionalism," including an 
aggressive approach toward that which is to be negotiated. 
They are uninterested in establishing long-term 
relationships, and view socializing as unimportant. The 
Chinese negotiators, on the contrary, feel that mutual 
interests and friendships are important in the negotiation 
process, so socializing during the contract agreement 
process is an expectation. The nature of the relationship 
between the parties involved is critical to the success or 
failure of a negotiation. 
In selecting negotiators, technical expertise serves as 
critical concern in the selection of American negotiation 
representatives. The social background, education, and age 
of candidates have little to do with their selection as 
negotiating team members or leaders. The selection of 
Chinese negotiators is based on largely on status and 
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knowledge, with age seniority being the single most 
important criterion used in the selection of team leaders. 
Also, Chinese negotiators expect to deal with someone of 
authority and high status, and they feel slighted if they do 
not negotiate with such individuals. 
In the process of decision-making, the authors point 
out that American negotiators view negotiations as problem-
solving sessions, even if no real problem exists. They tend 
to compartmentalize issues, focusing on one issue at a time, 
instead of negotiating many issues together. For the 
Chinese, decision-making is more authoritative with 
decisions made by high authorities without the inclusion of 
subordinates. Also, the Chinese state their propositions in 
the beginning and do not change it even if the opposing side 
raises questions. Concessions may come near the end of the 
negotiations. Hellweg, Samovar and Skow's study, although 
brief, offers enlightening insight in the different 
negotiation styles of Chinese and Americans. It can serve 
as guidelines for Sino-American negotiation. 
Of all the previous studies mentioned above, each 
offers new insight into the field of Sino-American 
negotiation. They have covered almost every aspect of Sino-
American negotiation. Studies such as Shenky and Ronen's 
(1987) interpersonal norms, Brunner and Wang's (1989) 
concept of Chinese face, and Hellweg, Samovar and Skow's 
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(1993) cultural variations in negotiation style offer very 
good understanding as well as sharp insight to Chinese 
culture and Chinese negotiation behavior. Also, Pye's study 
on Chinese commercial negotiating style, although a little 
cynical sometimes, has become a classic of Sino-American 
negotiation. However, all these studies, approaching the 
subject of Sino-American negotiation from the American 
perspective or Western perspective, offer only the American 
view or "Western view" of the subject. 
In the following chapters, I endeavor to approach the 
subject from a different perspective--a Chinese view of 
Sino-American negotiation. Following a general overview of 
nine important Chinese cultural factors, I will discuss the 
influence of these cultural factors on Chinese conflict-
management preferences and negotiation behavior. 
CHAPTER III 
CHINESE CULTURAL VALUES 
Kirkbride defines culture as "the means for, and the 
outcomes of, attempts by people to locate and confer meaning 
upon their lives, experience, events, and objects through 
the application of shared symbolic systems" (Kirkbride, 
1991, p. 366). Cultural values, defined by Samovar and 
Porter (1991), are a set of organized rules for making 
choices, reducing uncertainty, and reducing conflicts within 
a given society. 
Cultural values usually derive from the large 
philosophical issues inherent in a culture. These generally 
normative values inform a member of a culture what is good 
and bad, right and wrong, true and false, positive and 
negative. Cultural values define what is worth dying for, 
what is worth protecting, what frightens people, and what 
types of events lead individuals to group solidarity. 
Cultural values also specify important behavior and 
avoidance behavior within a culture. An exploration of 
certain fundamental Chinese cultural values should offer not 
only some insight into the perception and management of 
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conflict situations among the Chinese business people but 
also better understanding of the Chinese commercial 
negotiation behavior. 
The culture of traditional China encompasses diverse 
and competing philosophies, including Confucianism, Taoism, 
Buddhism, Legalism, and a host of local traditions. 
Nevertheless, the essence of traditional Chinese culture 
resides in the philosophical traditions of Confucianism and 
Taoism. These two philosophies continue to provide a moral, 
intellectual and social nexus for the Chinese psyche (Cheng, 
1986) . 
In addition to this philosophical tradition, a body of 
more recent empirical work also pertains to Chinese values. 
Pye (1982), in his Chinese Commercial Negotiation Style, 
mentions four Chinese values: friendship, time, face, and 
Guanxi, which are important to the understanding of Chinese 
negotiation practices, while Shenkar and Ronen (1987) have 
studied five values in their research: harmony, hierarchy 
(which includes the notion of conformity), reliance on 
kinship affiliation, collectivism, and indebtedness, which 
named also as reciprocity. In Redding's (1980) study, he 
mentions another four values important to the Chinese 
management process: holism or contextualism, polychronic 
time, morality, and practicality. In Beyond Culture, Edward 
Hall (1989) classifies Chinese culture as high context 
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culture. I have extracted, even at the risk of over-
simplification, nine key terms which depict core aspects of 
Chinese value orientations and psychological processes and 
which retain great relevance to conflict management 
preferences and negotiation behavior. These include 
harmony, collectivism, conformity, holism, contextualism, 
time, high-context, face, reciprocity, and quanxi. 
Harmony 
Confucianism stresses the notion of harmony between man 
and nature, between man and heaven, and between man and man. 
The Confucian "Doctrine of Mean" urges individuals to adapt 
to the collectivity, to control their own emotions, to avoid 
confusion, competition and conflict, and to maintain inner 
harmony. Showing restraint is the responsibility of the 
"gentleman" who, in the Confucian hierarchy, is the 
cultivated and learned person situated above all others. 
The cultivated person strives to maintain self-control 
regardless of the situation and thus conform to the Chinese 
ideal of "xinpinqihe" which means "being perfectly calm." 
Furthermore, to promote harmony, one must carefully 
control one's emotions in public. Raw emotions (even 
righteous indignation), once expressed, threaten the 
Confucian principle of harmony and tend to arouse strong 
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distrust, if not antipathy, among individuals. Therefore, 
no one expects a well-mannered Chinese to depart 
significantly from the norms of self-control. The idea of 
emotional control resides in the Chinese psyche. 
When harmony is important in interpersonal 
communications, politeness means more than showing common 
courtesy: it approaches a formal, stylized behavior. Such 
behavior does not depend on individual discretion, but is 
fixed according to social position and norms. Polite 
behavior is both expected and easily recognized, for 
example, in elaborate preparations for invited guests, or in 
the way one personally escorts one's guests beyond the front 
door, either part way to their homes or to their next 
destination. Similarly, impoliteness is considered not 
merely a simple oversight, but an insult not easily 
forgiven. 
The Chinese preference for restrained, moderate 
behavior suggests that one should avoid overtly aggressive 
behavior. The American task-oriented approach, which allows 
for the admission of difference in the positions of the 
parties to a negotiation so as to promote "honest 
confrontation," is viewed as aggressive and, therefore, as 
an unacceptable mode of behavior. Thus, emotionally charged 
attempts at persuasion are likely to fail when directed at 
the Chinese, and negotiators should consider other modes of 
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persuasion. However, negotiation is a transaction processed 
between both parties. Chinese negotiators need to 
understand and adapt to American culture and expectations in 
negotiation as well. 
Collectivism 
Chinese societies (including the People's Republic of 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) have frequently been 
described as "collectivist" (Bond and Hwang, 1986; Hofstede, 
1980; Lai and Lam, 1986; Westwood and Everett, 1987. The 
stress is not so much upon the individual and his/her 
interests, but on the maintenance of members within the 
society. Collectivism is frequently contrasted with the 
greater individualism and egocentrism said to be 
characteristic of American culture or Western culture. 
The collectivist position has implications for 
relationships within organizations. In problem situations 
or non-routine situations, including conflict and 
negotiation, a tendency may exist to locate the issue in 
terms of its importance for the group, organizational unit, 
or even society at large. Efforts arise to avoid 
antagonisms that unsettle the group or that place the 
individual in confrontation with his/her group. It also 
suggests that the value patterns associated with 
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collectivism will be likely to lead to the avoidance of 
conflict and to the seeking of harmonious relationships and 
collective positions within the organization. 
Conformity 
Conformity serves as a central theme in the traditional 
Chinese societies. The idea of conformity relates to two 
key Confucian values. First, it relates to the "rules of 
propriety" which structure interpersonal relationships into 
hierarchy dualities such as "prince-minister," "father-son," 
"husband-wife," "elder brother-younger brother," and "senior 
friend-younger friend." Each individual is to adjust 
him/herself to these prescribed interpersonal relationships. 
Second, there exists the Confucian concept which emphasizes 
that man does not exist as a separate entity but remains 
inextricably bound within his context: his family, his clan, 
and his sovereign. Each individual is to conform to 
prescribed social structures and relationships and to the 
appropriate forms of social behavior. Thus, there exists a 
strong and ritualistically reinforced set of norms that 
guides behavior and is difficult to negate. 
Hofstede's (1980) empirical study reports South-East 
Asian Chinese-dominated societies scoring high on power 
distance, a view corroborated by others (Lai and Lam, 1986; 
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Westwood and Evertt, 1987). These societies accept large 
power distances between individuals, groups, and social 
status, and they view this state of affairs as right and 
natural. 
A further conformity, then, exists to the natural power 
relationships. This conformity, together with the 
associated collectivism, leads individuals to consider the 
relationship between themselves and the other party as one 
of the crucial factors in any conflict situation. There 
exists a tendency for the Chinese to avoid confrontation for 
fear of disturbing the relationships and their mutual 
dependence. When a dispute begins between a supervisor and 
a subordinate, the natural deference to authority will lead 
to the subordinate accommodating the superior's wishes. The 
perceived authority and status of parties to an 
organizational exchange has a strong bearing upon the manner 
in which the exchange is able to develop and the types of 
outcome that can be expected. 
Hoiism-Contextualism 
Redding states that a holistic perspective and a high 
degree of sensitivity to context characterizes Chinese 
thought process (Redding, 1980). Therefore, Chinese people 
will attempt to relate a particular issue or event to the 
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total situation and to the context in which the event or 
issue occurs. An unwillingness to separate specific from 
the totality and from the wider context makes it difficult 
to deal with particular issues in isolation. This holism 
and contextualism may, for example, take the form of placing 
events and issues in their historical context. 
When conflicts emerge, a tendency to diffuse them may 
arise by locating the issue in terms of the wider scheme of 
things. For example, many American business people in China 
have complained that the Chinese negotiators like to bring 
up the past mistreatment of China in regard to the present 
issues at hand. Thus, many American commentators warn 
American business people to be very careful not to mix 
present issues with the past performances. However, this 
process also connects with the search for harmony by seeing 
issues as part of a united whole. The Chinese will seek 
harmonious relationship even when there are issues at hand. 
They will make concessions at the very end of the 
negotiation. 
Time 
In Beyond Culture, Hall (1981) introduces two kinds of 
time concepts: monochronic time (M-time) and polychronic 
time (P-time). According to Hall, monochronic time 
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emphasizes schedules, segmentation, and promptness. 
Polychronic time systems are characterized by several things 
happening at once. They stress involvement of people and 
completion of transactions rather than adherence to present 
schedules. Polychronic time is treated less tangibly than 
monochronic time. Polychronic time is apt to considered a 
point rather than a ribbon or a road, and that point is 
sacred. Redding (1980) suggests that the Chinese perceive 
time as polychronic, non-linear, repetitive and associated 
with events, in contrast with what he takes to be a Western 
orientation, where time exists as monochronic, sequential, 
absolute and prompt. He quotes another philosopher's 
comment about the Chinese concept of time: 
Absolute time was hardly touched upon in Chinese 
philosophy. With Chinese philosophers, time has 
always been associated with events. In Buddhism, 
since events are illusory, time is illusory. As 
such it moves on but will come to an end in 
Nirvana. In Taoism, time travels in a circle, 
since a thing comes from non-being and returns to 
non-being (Redding, 1980, p. 134) . 
The polychronic time concept has implications for the 
way to handle conflict situations in general and 
negotiations in particular. China traders and communicators 
such as Pye (1982) and Rae (1982) have repeatedly referred 
to the difficulties and frustrations that follow from 
Americans encountering a different view of the time 
dimension and different conceptions of urgency- The 
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different notions about the timeliness of events and about 
progress represents a potential source of confusion between 
American and Chinese negotiators. It may mean that the 
Chinese fail to provide, or fail to work to, a schedule that 
American negotiators can identify. The American may become 
confused and frustrated at the apparent insensitivity of the 
Chinese to time, procedure, schedule and deadline, and at 
their habit of negotiating several issues at one time. 
Face 
Face has been defined as "the positive social value a 
person effectively claims for himself by the line others 
assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an 
image of self delineated in terms of approval social 
attributes" (Goffman, 1955, p. 213). Face, a concept which 
has universal application and significance (Bond and Hwang, 
1986; Ho, 1986), has particular salience for the Chinese. 
This salience relates to the greater collectivism of Chinese 
cultures and to the greater focus on "shame" as a method of 
social control. 
The Chinese express their concern about face in this 
proverb: "People want their face the same as a tree wants 
its bark." Generally, there are two Chinese concepts of 
face: lien and mian-tzu. Lien usually refers to society's 
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respect for an individual with a good moral reputation, 
thereby perceiving him as one who fulfills his 
responsibilities regardless of the efforts and consequences 
involved, and who demonstrates that he is a decent human 
being. Mian-tzu, on the other hand, refers to the 
attainment of an achieved status by working hard, 
negotiating with skill, working well with others, and 
effectively applying knowledge and personal judgement. 
Nonpersonal factors such as authority, social status and 
wealth also contribute to mien-tzu. Currently, political 
status remains a primary factor in determining an 
individual's status in society. 
Mien-tzu exemplifies the type of prestige emphasized in 
the United States. Mien-tzu depends on personal effort and 
nonpersonal factors, while lien is an internalized as well 
as socialized sanction enforcing moral standards. 
Furthermore, one can not gain lien, as one is expected to 
live according to the precepts of his culture; favorable or 
exemplary acts will, however, add to one's mien-tzu. Thus, 
a person's face relates to his station in society and not to 
his personality. 
In Chinese society one's face is not solely the 
responsibility of the individual, but is influenced also by 
the actions of those with whom he is closely associated, and 
how he is perceived and dealt with by others. The emphasis 
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is upon the reciprocity of obligations, dependence and the 
protection of the esteem of those involved. The key to an 
understanding of face dynamics, therefore, is reciprocity; 
the Chinese emphasize that one should not only protect one's 
own face but extend face to others. Both are of equal 
importance. 
In conflict situations, aggressive behavior from either 
party can damage the face of the other. Not giving face to 
a person is perceived as denying that person's pride and 
dignity, so the Chinese maintain the implications of 
antagonism and aggression and normally hesitate to engage in 
such behavior (Brunner and Wang, 1988) . In addition, the 
adoption of "face-giving" and "face-saving" behavior in 
conflict situations is valued as means to maintain a sense 
of harmony. The Chinese view it as shameful to disturb 
group or interpersonal harmony, a sensitivity rooted in the 
culture which is developed but reinforced through childhood 
rearing practices based upon shaming techniques and group 
loyalty. 
Shame 
A number of commentators (Pye, 1982, Cheung, 1986, 
Brunner and Wang, 1988) characterize Chinese and other Asian 
societies as "shame" orientated cultures, where shame refers 
41 
to an interpersonal frame in which behavior is compared to 
social norms rather than internalized personal standards, as 
in Western guilt cultures. Thus, despite the pervading 
tendency to avoid aggressive behavior in conflict management 
situations, one can not rule out the possibility of shaming 
behaviors in certain contexts. 
Brunner and Wang (1988) indicate that the Chinese 
shaming approach permeates Chinese relations with others and 
is developed early in childhood as a means by which parents 
maintain parental control. The primary sanction is through 
the arousal of the fear of abandonment. The techniques 
which are used in shame societies involve training in 
controlling one's behavior manifested by morals and 
perfecting one's behavior. It is a feeling of inferiority, 
embarrassment, dishonor, ridicule and a "loss of face" on 
the shamed ones who sometimes goes so far as to commit 
suicide because of loss of face. In fact, shaming functions 
as one of the major forces in Chinese group interaction; it 
permeates Chinese relations and is used to control others. 
The Chinese genuinely believe that if the other party can be 
shamed into doing the right thing, the offender will be 
grateful and not resentful. 
However, when the Chinese use the tactic of shaming, 
they can be easily satisfied by symbolic responses that do 
not affect the substance of the issues being protested. An 
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admission that what was done may not have been appropriate 
can, by itself, satisfy the Chinese without the need of 
retraction (Pye, 1985, p. 97). 
Reciprocity 
Like face, the principle of re-ciprocity or indebtedness 
is a universal one, but in the Chinese societies the 
concepts of "ranging" (favor) and "Pao" (reciprocation) have 
particular salience: 
The Chinese believe that reciprocity of actions 
(favor and hatred, reward and punishment) between 
man and man, and indeed between man and super-
natural beings, should be as certain as a cause-
and-effect relationship, and therefore, when a 
Chinese acts, he normally anticipates a response 
or return. Favors done for others are often 
considered what may be termed "social investment" 
for which handsome returns are expected (Yang, 
1957, p. 291). 
Thus, concessions made by one party are normally 
expected to be responded to by an equal amount of 
concessions made by the opposing party. Favor is expected 
to be reciprocated by the Chinese, and therefore they are 
more willing to invest in conflict situations by initiating 
a compromise solution. While the principle provides a 
justification for retribution, it is also likely to lead to 
mutual benefit seeking and compromise rather than 
destructive tit for tat. 
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In short, the principle of reciprocity indicates that 
the Chinese will surely expect favors or concessions from 
the Americans if the Chinese have made concessions in their 
negotiation with the Americans. Similarly, the Chinese will 
certainly return favors or make concessions to the Americans 
if they have received favors from them. This principle may 
be also practiced in American, but it has great importance 
in Chinese business transaction. 
High Context and Friendship 
Hall (1981) categorized cultures as either high-context 
cultures or low-context cultures. In high-context cultures 
most of the information is either in the physical context or 
is internalized in the people who are a part of the 
interaction. Very little information is actually coded in 
the verbal message. In low-context cultures, however, most 
of the information is contained in the verbal message and 
very little is embedded in the context or within the 
participants. In high-context cultures people tend to be 
more aware of their surrounding and their environment and do 
not rely on verbal communication as their main information 
source. 
Warrington and McCall (1983, p. 5), among others, have 
characterized the Chinese culture as a high-context culture. 
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In this culture people communicate allusively rather than 
directly, and nonverbal communications and hinted meanings 
are as important as the explicit messages. Generally, the 
Chinese people are highly sensitive to the effect on others 
of what they say. They weigh their words carefully and know 
that whatever they say will be scrutinized and taken to 
heart. In face-to-face conversations, a few words spoken by 
one party may contain a variety of meanings in it. Chinese 
people generally prefer indirectness and dislike 
contradiction. It is usually hard for a Chinese to deliver 
a blunt "no." They wish to please their interlocutors, and 
they prefer inaccuracy and evasion to painful precision. 
Unlike the Americans, who generally seek equality and 
informality in their relationships, the Chinese put much 
emphasis on personal relationships. They distinguish levels 
of friendships, separating the acquaintances from the 
intimates. Whereas formality and distance characterize 
one's relationship with one's colleagues, one expresses 
himself freely and openly only with his intimates. 
The Chinese usually attempt to separate affective 
association from economic association, preferring to do 
business with friends but not intimates. They regard as 
valued business colleagues or acquaintances those with whom 
one interacts regularly, whose behavior has become 
predictable, and against whom one may apply limited 
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sanctions without destroying relationships with them. As 
some American negotiators have noted, Chinese business has 
the norm of keeping relationships going on long after 
business has been done. 
The Chinese perception of friendship as an important 
factor in doing business with others determines the Chinese 
outlook on the informal phase of the negotiation process. 
In contrast to Americans, who may view breaks in the 
negotiation process as mere relaxation or social gathering, 
the Chinese regard behavior away from the negotiation table 
as having importance equal to that during negotiation. 
Because the Chinese develop close friends slowly, the 
American negotiators should remain keenly aware of both the 
limits of familiarity and specific social obligations 
appropriate to the type of contact being made. Also, 
because the Chinese pay much attention to hinted meanings, 
American negotiators should pay special attention to 
nonverbal gestures in negotiating with the Chinese. 
Guanxi 
The concept of guanxi, which refers to the status and 
intensity of an ongoing relationship between two parties, 
also serves as an important factor in Sino-American 
negotiation. In a collectivist society, guanxi between two 
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parties is extended to include other parties who are within 
the social network of the interacting parties but who may 
not actually be present in the interaction. Thus, when two 
parties interact, they will not only consider their own 
relationship and its future but also their relationship with 
those external third parties and how they will perceive and 
receive the behavior of the interacting parties. 
It could be argued, then, that one would be likely to 
seek mutually satisfying compromise or accommodation if one 
works with the anticipation of a continuing relationship 
with the other party- The relationship particularly applies 
if the other party is perceived to be of high social status 
or associated with a prestigious social network. On a 
similar note, the traditional Chinese respect for age and 
status also has a bearing upon conflict situations. The 
Chinese will be cognizant of the age and status of those 
with whom they are in conflict, and that awareness will 
affect the manner in which the situation will be handled. 
Relationships with older people and those of higher status 
will be more highly valued and there will be greater 
attempts to maintain guanxi and to protect face in such 
circumstance. 
CHAPTER IV CHINESE CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT 
PREFERENCES AND NEGOTIATION 
1. Chinese Conflict Management Preferences 
How do traditional Chinese values and cognitive 
processes affect conflict management preferences? In order 
to answer this question, we need a theoretical framework for 
describing potential conflict management orientations. 
Perhaps the most well-known and widely accepted model is 
that of Thomas (1976), which identifies five different 
conflict-handling styles--competing, collaborating, 
compromising, avoiding, accommodating--all of which result 
from different levels and mixtures of assertiveness and 
cooperation. (See Figure 1 on next page.) 
Competing is a power-oriented mode in which one pursues 
one's own concerns at the other person's expense in a manner 
which is both assertive and cooperative. In this approach 
one party attempts to talk with the other party in an effort 
to find an interactive and mutually satisfying solution. 
Avoiding occurs when one is unassertive and yet 
uncooperative. Interests are not articulated, and the 
conflict is postponed to resurface at a later stage. 
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Figure 1 
The Thomas Model of Conflict-Management Styles 
Adapted from Thomas (1976) 
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Accommodating represents a mix of cooperativeness and 
unassertiveness and occurs when one neglects one's own 
concerns in order to satisfy the concerns of the other 
party. Compromising represents an intermediate position in 
terms of both assertiveness and cooperation and a situation 
where both parties satisfy at least some of their concerns. 
However, the conceptions of compromise may vary cross-
culturally. 
The Thomas model is operationalized via the Thomas-
Kilmann Conflict Model Instrument (Thomas and Kilmann, 
1976), which consists of thirty pairs of statements 
describing different behavioral responses to conflict 
situations. Typical items contrast responses such as these: 
0 9 
competing collaborating 
0 
compromising 
Avoiding accommodating 
$ 
Uncooperative > Cooperative 
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"I try to avoid creating unpleasantness for myself" and "I 
try to win my position"; or "I try to find a compromise 
solution" and "I sometimes sacrifice my own wishes for the 
wishes of the other person." Respondents are forced to 
choose the response most typical of their own behavior from 
each pair of statements, and the resulting pattern of 
responses generates individual scores for each of the five 
conflict orientations. This model and instrument has 
universal applications and can be used cross-culturally. 
Specifically, it can be used as the theoretical foundation 
for Chinese conflict-management preferences. 
As mentioned before, the traditional Chinese culture 
puts much emphasis on conformity, collectivism and harmony. 
These orientations combine to create social pressures and 
expectations which influence Chinese people to be less 
openly assertive and emotional in conflict situations. 
Thus, they naturally lead to the adaption of high 
compromising and avoiding behaviors and a relatively low 
preference for competing and assertive postures. The 
cultural imperative towards harmoniousness, group 
mindedness, relationship-centeredness and the need to 
maintain interpersonal equilibrium militates against the 
adaptation of openly confrontational and overtly competitive 
styles of behavior. 
Similarly, a holistic perspective may at times lead to 
50 
a consideration of the total situation, and the broader 
context and meta-perspective may further work to reduce 
antagonism that might otherwise surface in the immediate 
situation. The fear of shame as a result of damaging or 
breaking social norms or damaging someone else's face also 
leads Chinese people to avoid assertive or aggressive 
styles. All these characteristics suggest a likely 
preference for compromising and avoiding styles. The 
conformist tendencies and hierarchical nature of the Chinese 
social structure would also indicate the undesirability of 
being too assertive in conflict situations. 
Taking responsibilities suggests the risk of being 
wrong; it also opens up the possibility of engaging in 
behaviors that are perceived to be antithetical to social 
expectations and the required mechanism of the hierarchy. 
It may seem better to avoid that possibility by seeking safe 
common ground or collective responsibility, or again to 
engage in avoidance behavior. 
The operations of guanxi, face, power, and reciprocity 
are somewhat more complex. The degree of assertiveness and 
cooperativeness that a person can exhibit in a given 
situation may depend upon known or perceived differences in 
the authority, power, status, social connectedness, and face 
of the conflicting parties. An individual who is high in 
organizational or social status can appear to be less 
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accommodating, while his opponent may need to accede to him. 
However, if the two parties are of similar status or are 
closely associated, they will either compromise or 
collaborate. Thus, all orientations may occur in situations 
of unequal status or power. Even in unequal situations 
there is value in maintaining guanxi, in saving face, and in 
the widely held norms of reciprocity. The nonassertive 
styles of compromise and avoidance remain the clear 
preferences in most situations. 
The Chinese conflict management preferences have been 
empirically identified by Tang and Kirkbride (1986), who 
report cultural differences in conflict management 
orientations in Hong Kong Civil Services between local 
Chinese and expatriate British executives. The results of 
the study suggest significant differences in conflict 
management preferences with the Chinese executives favoring 
less assertive compromising and avoiding behaviors as their 
dominant orientation while their British counterparts 
preferred more assertive collaborating and competing 
orientation. 
Hwang (1985) examined the social-cultural stress, 
coping strategies, and psychopathological symptoms of 180 
married men who were household heads of families residing in 
urban Taipei, Taiwan. The age of the subjects ranged from 
30 to 60 years and their socio-economic status from low to 
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high. On the basis of his results, Hwang developed a model 
to illustrate the dynamic process of coping with 
interpersonal conflicts in Chinese culture. The model 
indicates that, when facing an interpersonal conflict 
situation, an individual may adopt an active or passive 
coping strategy. The active coping strategy includes two 
alternatives: the mechanism of facing reality or the 
mechanism of self-assertion. The passive coping strategy is 
mainly characterized by perseverance or avoiding. Eighty 
percent of Hwang's interviewees adopted the avoidance 
strategy; only twenty percent adopted the self-assertion 
approach. 
Frankenstein (1985) conducted a survey among 28 
American business people in Beijing on the cooperativeness 
of Chinese negotiators. The result indicates that 77% of 
the interview group felt that Chinese negotiators tended to 
be cooperative rather than adversarial. Pye (1982), Brunner 
and Wang (1988) indicated similar findings: that the Chinese 
conflict preferences were for accommodation, flexibility and 
conciliation. These preferences, together with the ones we 
discussed above, can exert great impact on negotiation 
behavior. In the following chapters, I will discuss the 
application of these preferences on the process of Sino-
American negotiation as well as their impact on Chinese 
negotiation behavior. 
53 
2. Chinese Conflict-Management Preferences and Negotiation 
In this section I shall examine the different phases in 
Chinese business negotiation and the conflict-management 
preferences of the Chinese in each of the phases. Various 
schemes have been suggested for breaking the negotiating 
process down into its component parts. One of the most 
original is that of Zartman and Berman (1982), who talk of 
diagnostic, formula, and detail phases. Another imaginative 
model is that of Druckman (1986), who sees turning points 
and crises taking negotiators over a series of negotiating 
thresholds. Frankenstein (1986) introduced four phases of 
negotiation: opening moves, assessment, end-game, and 
implementation, while Cohen (1991) found five phases: 
prenegotiation, opening moves, middle game I, middle game 
II, and end game. For the sake of simplicity, I will use 
the framework suggested by the Industrial Relations Training 
Resource Center (1980), dividing negotiation into four 
general phases: exploration, expectation, solution and 
finalizing. 
The first stage is exploration, where the two sides 
try to find out more about the position of the other and 
their willingness to move from it. In situations where the 
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parties are new to each other, this stage would also 
probably involve an exploration of the background, 
personality and character of the other party. In fact, this 
stage is similar to Frankenstein's (1986) first stage of 
opening moves and also similar to Cohen's (1991) 
prenegotiation phase. 
The second stage is expectation structuring, where the 
two parties attempt to create favorable perceptions of their 
own positions and unfavorable perceptions of their 
opponent's. Each party also attempts to condition the other 
into an expectation of movement, concession, and compromise. 
This stage is similar to Frankenstein's (1986) assessment 
phase and to Cohen's (1991) opening moves. 
The third stage is that of movement and solution 
building. Here, the emphasis is on linking issues, trading 
issues and concessions, and on the movement from initial 
positions in the search for an agreed basis for a 
settlement. The final stage is finalizing the agreement, 
which involves the reading of a final agreement followed by 
summarizing, recording and implementation. 
A spiral is one way to visualize ana summarize the 
model (see Figure 2). 
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The Chinese preference for compromise as a conflict 
resolution method has implication for the exploration phase 
of negotiation. It could suggest that parties who expect to 
reach compromise solution in the bargaining process will 
correspondingly give themselves greater room for maneuver 
and movement by setting higher initial demands or more 
extreme initial offers. This approach contrasts with those 
who might prefer confrontational styles and who retain 
greater expectations of resolving conflict on or near their 
own terms. In such situations, the negotiator might make an 
initial demand or offer which is nearer to the potential 
settlement (Graham and Herberger, 1983). 
The less assertive compromising and avoiding 
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orientations of the Chinese also impact behavior in the 
second phase of expectation structuring. Lower 
assertiveness means that the Chinese will tend to engage in 
less extreme verbal posturing and aggressive position-
taking. One would therefore expect less open argumentation 
and debate in the negotiation process. In fact, 
argumentation or debates usually contain elements of 
confrontation and offending, which are viewed as negative 
behaviors in China and should be avoided. Becker (1986) has 
traced this phenomenon beyond the narrow confines of 
conflict-management situations and suggests that the Chinese 
avoidance of open argumentation and dispute has its roots 
not only in philosophical traditions but also in social-
linguistic and even geo-demographic factors. For example, 
the Chinese word " Mao ren," which means "somebody," is very 
often used in situations when someone has done something 
wrong and the misconduct or misbehavior needs to be 
criticized or blamed. Instead of mentioning the exact name 
of the person who has misbehaved and who should be blamed, 
the Chinese would mention "mao ren" did something and should 
be criticized. Further, people from North China speak more 
polite language than people from South China. The well-
educated people speak more polite language and have less 
open argumentation than the uneducated people do. 
As mentioned before, Chinese culture belongs to the 
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high-context cultural groups where face and harmony retain 
great importance and where people communicate allusively 
rather than directly. However, the Americans find it very 
frustrating when the Chinese avoid making any clear 
statement of position and argument in negotiations. Where 
Americans, because of their linguistic, social and 
educational backgrounds, will usually proceed by assembling 
a series of what they perceive to be logical points and 
arguments about a specific set of issues, the Chinese seem 
to remain at a level of general principles and of what is 
often taken to be rather vague and ambiguous language. 
The American negotiators who are more used to the open 
verbal explication of bargaining positions may feel that the 
real issues of the Chinese are not emerging since the 
Chinese appear concerned only about the general principles, 
not the details. However, it turns out, as the negotiation 
progresses, that the general principles concerning agreement 
on intentions and mutual goals are as important for the 
Chinese as are the "real issues" for the Americans. As 
Becker (1986)points out, "Confusion about the real issues 
stems in part from a different perception of what the "real 
issues" are and from a conceptual and linguistic difference" 
(Becker, p. 31). 
While the Chinese score low in terms of self-
assertiveness, they may vary in terms of cooperativeness. 
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This point is picked up by Pye (1982), who argues that 
Chinese negotiators oscillate between obstinacy and 
flexibility: 
At one moment they are described as being 
stubborn, firm, and tenacious, willing to wait 
with oriental patience for the other side to give 
in; but they are also said to be realists, ready 
to adjust quickly to imperatives of human 
relations, and always anxious to be conciliatory 
if given a chance. They are thus seen as being 
both unyielding and highly adaptable, determined 
to have things their own way, but also considerate 
of the other side's requirements (Pye, 1982, p. 
68) . 
Generally, the Chinese will be obstinate in negotiating 
whenever they feel that the "principles" of the relationship 
are being challenged, their long-range objectives are being 
challenged, or what is being proposed does not fit in lines 
with their current economic plans and situations; otherwise, 
the Chinese are very adaptable and flexible. Pye also 
suggests that Chinese flexibility is related to the initial 
and terminal phases of the negotiation process. It is 
closely linked to Chinese practices of hospitality at the 
beginning and to their style of arriving at settlements near 
the end of negotiation (p. 69). This flexibility can be 
further associated with the need to settle basic principles 
that are holistic and contextual in nature in the early 
phase and with the perception of the relationship being an 
ongoing one that does not change in the later phases. Here, 
we come to know that during the middle phases the Chinese 
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negotiator may be very obstinate and unwilling to move. 
Thus, tactics in negotiation at this stage may involve 
referring back to the general principles stated by the 
Chinese and urging them to the adaptation of the principles. 
The major implications of the Chinese conflict style 
preferences become most apparent in the third phase of 
negotiation: movement and solution building. In this stage 
the conflict escaping behaviors adopted by Chinese 
individuals make the resolution of conflict very difficult 
and slow. On the other hand, the relative preference for 
compromise solutions can affect the dynamics of this stage. 
However, despite the lack of concern for time pressures and 
long delays in negotiation, the Chinese are quite capable of 
suddenly constructing a compromise solution at this stage 
without any previous explicit verbal processes of linkage 
and trading. This sudden compromise is both a function of 
their expectation of the acceptability of a compromise and 
the greater amount of time spent in the earlier phases of 
negotiation. It is often put in terms of an inevitable 
discovery of a solution that is of "mutual benefit" by the 
Chinese terms. It is the idea of the Chinese negotiators 
that "mutual benefit" is held to be both desirable and 
discoverable right from the beginning and that the search 
for this mutual benefit is what the negotiation process is 
all about. The preliminary discussion on basic principles 
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will attempt to cast the negotiation in this light. 
Another true explanation of the sudden compromise of 
the Chinese at the end of the negotiation is that after a 
long time of negotiation the Chinese have thoroughly studied 
the position of their opposing party and have come to the 
conclusion that their own benefit has been maximized. Thus, 
they make sudden and unpredicted compromises near the end of 
negotiation. 
Concerning the concept of compromise, different notions 
exist between Chinese and Americans. In the United States, 
compromise is generally seen as a process of "horse trading, 
trade-offs, give-and-take, and mutual concessions." 
However, the Chinese, as Pye notes, "apparently see less 
inherent merit in the concept of compromise than Americans 
do. Instead, the Chinese prefer to hold up for praise the 
ideals of mutual interests, of joint endeavors, and of 
commonality of purpose" (p. 77). As is perhaps already 
clear, this concept of compromise could be a direct result 
of the influence of the traditional Chinese values. The 
effect is that the Chinese will set high opening positions 
and be willing to move to a compromise position--a common 
enough process. However, when they reach the point of 
settlement, they prefer to think that a retreat is conducted 
by both sides and that all along both sides have had their 
mutual interests realized finally. 
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Thus, for Americans, compromise is acknowledged as a 
necessary but sub-optimal solution where concessions are 
articulated and justified by identical concessions from the 
other side. For the Chinese, compromise is acknowledged as 
the reconciliation of mutual interests through a commonality 
of purpose and thus as optimum solution. These divergent 
views obviously have important implications for the tactics 
to be adopted in cross-cultural negotiations. 
CHAPTER V 
CHINESE NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR AND 
CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
In this chapter I will discuss the application of the 
Chinese cultural factors on Chinese negotiation behaviors. 
For the sake of clarity, I will divide this chapter into two 
parts: (1)general applications of the cultural factors and 
(2) applications of the cultural factors to specific stages. 
Part I: General Applications 
Traditional Chinese cultural values and cognitive 
processes have great influence on the Chinese negotiation 
and bargaining process. First of all, the Chinese respect 
for authority hierarchy, and power naturally leads to the 
relative status of the parties to the negotiation becoming a 
very important factor. The Chinese take a keen interest in 
people who are sent to negotiate with them and want to 
ascertain their authority and status. The status of the 
opposition will be read as measure of the seriousness with 
which the other party is approaching the negotiation and as 
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a reflection of the level of respect being shown. An 
opponent of insufficient status may give rise to a loss of 
face on the Chinese side. Thus, Brunner and Wang (1988) 
suggest that (the American team's) "president or other high 
officials should initiate the process, and thereby give face 
to the Chinese" (p. 37) . 
The Chinese respect for cultural traditions and social 
etiquette means that negotiations can take on a high level 
of formalism from an American point of view. Traditional 
Chinese hierarchies were in part maintained through a 
developed system of rites and rituals. Ritual remains a 
feature of formal interaction between parties in China. 
Generally, Chinese business meetings are highly formalized. 
There will probably be a carpet on the floor, a coffee table 
with a thermos of hot water, tea cups, expensive cigarettes, 
and flowers for the occasion to provide the desired 
atmosphere. The interpreter will introduce the Chinese in 
order of title or rank, and do likewise for the visitors. 
All will then be seated properly by status, and polite talk 
will continue which may be perceived by the Americans to 
last for an unduly lengthy time. The conversations will be 
polite, and well-chosen language will be used in the 
speeches. 
Kazuo (1979) notes that even when the Chinese 
negotiator resorts to displays of anger and frustration, he 
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or she may appear to do so in ritualistic ways. Certainly, 
the highly formalized and ritualized behavior represents a 
symbolic form that can be confusing to the foreigner. For 
example, Graham and Herberger (1983) point out that the 
Americans' stress on informality and equality can be found 
in a "just call me Jack" mentality, blinding Americans to 
the importance of status differences and formal gestures and 
rituals. 
Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on collectivity and 
conformity means that the Chinese negotiation team will be 
large, perhaps involving anywhere from five to ten times as 
many people as are actually present with the foreigners. 
Usually, the Chinese team will work as a group, not as 
individuals. While the head of the team plays an important 
role in decision making, the whole group is responsible for 
the whole process of negotiating. 
In contrast to the American emphasis on individual 
success, the Chinese emphasize the success of the group, 
whether this group represents a kinship entity or a modern 
administrative unit. Anyone desiring personal gain and 
benefits threatens established group hierarchies and risks 
being accused of wild ambition. The Chinese generally take 
a negative view of any group member who actively seeks 
attention. The ideal behavior of a Chinese negotiating team 
member is to separate the public from the private--that is, 
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personal—interest. Often individual group members feel the 
need to reassure their colleagues that they do not seek 
personal gain at the group's expense. Consequently, social 
or organizational failure to cooperate is frequently 
attributed to personal jealousy. An American who tries to 
influence a Chinese counterpart by suggesting that this 
person will gain personal benefits will soon discover that 
such an approach will fail. Thus, the American negotiators 
should always approach the Chinese negotiation team as a 
group, never as individuals. 
Further, the high-context culture of the Chinese 
indicates that keeping harmony and face in negotiation is 
very important to the Chinese, who will, by all means, try 
to avoid any open confrontations and conflicts as much as 
possible and who will shun any proposal-counter-proposal 
style of negotiating. They will make decisions privately or 
behind the scenes so that they may preserve both harmony and 
face. Brunner and Wang (1988) suggest that Americans should 
learn to "give face" while dealing with the Chinese. They 
should go to great lengths not to embarrass their Chinese 
counterparts and cause them to "lose face." In 
negotiations, if the Chinese negotiators have made an error, 
they will probably try to ignore the error or cover it up in 
order to save face. Thus, unless it is of major 
consequence, Americans should not comment on the Chinese 
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behavior, even though the Americans themselves have 
committed the error, they will admit it and rectify the 
problem. 
Furthermore, the Chinese perception of time and the 
Chinese values of persistence and patience combine to ensure 
that negotiations continue longer than would be expected in 
the West. In China, the cultural values work with 
bureaucratic systems to produce "a rather round about 
process that proceeds at a leisurely pace through several 
phases" (Frankenstein, 1986). In fact, negotiators for the 
Chinese side generally possess little or no actual decision-
making authority. They must review any proposals or 
agreements with their superiors or higher authorities to 
gain approval. These decisions may take an extended period 
of time. There are many tales of American business persons 
becoming very frustrated at the protracted nature of Chinese 
negotiations; this practice of protraction is compounded by 
an absence of any schedules so that there is no notion of 
time frame involved. 
The Chinese place considerable emphasis upon personal 
relationships, even in the business context. This mode of 
behavior is manifested and reinforced by the notion of 
guanxi. The Chinese negotiator often seems to expect and 
desire a level of personal relationship with his counterpart 
that would be viewed as unnecessary in the West. Pye 
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(1982), perhaps somewhat cynical, tends to view this 
emphasis on personal relationship as an attempt by the 
Chinese to create some kind of emotional bond with the other 
party and to spin a web of dependency. The development of 
personal relationships in negotiations is consistent with 
the notion of guanxi and perhaps also with the notions of 
"interpersonal equilibrium," "relationship-centeredness," 
and with a general collectivist orientation (Hofstede, 
1980) . 
Part II: Application to Specific Stages 
As described before, negotiations can be divided into 
four stages: exploration, expectation, solution building and 
finalizing. During the first phase of the negotiation 
process, exploration, a number of distinct behaviors can be 
identified which appear to be related to the general Chinese 
cultural values. The first of these concerns is the 
expanded length of time this phase can take in a Chinese 
negotiation situation. This behavior pattern is in part 
explained by the concept of guanxi or relationship. The 
Chinese like to do business with friends, not strangers. 
The setting of relationship or guanxi between the parties 
not only can reduce the feeling of insecurity and 
uncertainty of the parties but also can create a kind of 
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affinity which will facilitate the later conduct of 
negotiation. Thus, the Chinese put much emphasis in setting 
up a relationship with American partners and are very 
careful in gathering information about their partner's needs 
and perceptions through informal contacts. For example, the 
Chinese will try to find out through informal contacts what 
the Americans really want from the business transaction, 
what their position is, what kind of proposal they will 
accept or not accept, etc. All these processes obviously 
delay the move to the second phase of the negotiation. 
Another feature of what Frankenstein (1986) calls the 
"opening moves" phase of negotiation is the effort expended 
on establishing basic principles and upon locating general 
areas of mutual interests. For the non-Chinese, the 
emphasis on basic principles often appears to be merely 
philosophical rather than strategic, or ritualistic rhetoric 
rather than substantive content. It is a mistake to view it 
in these terms, since the principles may reflect the 
necessary holistic view the Chinese are taking and that, 
more pragmatically, will be used strategically in later 
phases. 
Chinese negotiators often seem to want to stay at the 
level of generalities and to avoid details and specifics for 
much longer than is common in the West. This focus upon the 
general principles and mutual goals may also reflect a 
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culturally derived wish to postpone open confrontation and 
direct conflict, which may be hard to avoid once specific 
substantive issues are engaged. One could argue, however, 
that it is simply good negotiating strategy, since general 
agreement to key principles by the other side at an early 
stage can serve to bind them at a later stage. Moreover, 
the general principles agreed upon by the two parties at the 
early stage express good intentions and good will, paving 
the way for later successful negotiation. 
During the second phase of the negotiation process, we 
can see the impact of at least two central Chinese values. 
The first value is the role of face. Given the importance 
of maintaining relationships and harmony, as well as the 
prescriptions of the Confucian ethic, it is important that 
each party gives face to the other. Thus, the expectation 
structuring phase can consist of extensive "facework," which 
may appear to Americans as excessive flattery or humility. 
Despite requirements to save face, the Chinese may use 
"shaming" tactics in negotiations. Chinese negotiators will 
attempt to modify the other side's behavior or position by 
inferring, usually somewhat indirectly, that commonly 
accepted social norms and modes of behavior have been 
broken. In dealing with foreigners, they will attempt to 
make references to what they take as the norms and values of 
those societies or, referring to past actions or statements, 
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they will demonstrate deficiencies or inconsistencies. It 
has been argued that the Chinese are very skillful at 
picking out inconsistences and other deficiencies in the 
opposing side's arguments and in exploiting them. The 
Chinese seem to take the view that they can directly 
influence the behaviors of others by such "shaming" tactics. 
This negotiation practice, according to Ho (1986), "reflects 
the wider ethical order of the Chinese and is an extension 
of traditional Chinese control and socialization patterns" 
(Ho, p. 45). However, during this second phase, the pace is 
leisurely and the approach is indirect. There may be an 
emphasis on what some American negotiators call the "soft" 
or peripheral issues. The "hard" items come in the third 
phase. 
In the third stage of the negotiation process, the 
Chinese holistic perspective has great influence. As Yang 
has pointed out, "Chinese people, especially adults, tend to 
display a cognitive style of seeing things or phenomena in 
wholes rather than in parts while Westerners tend to do the 
reverse" (1986, p. 147). This tendency may, in turn, be 
related to traditional Chinese values associated with the 
concept of harmony. "In this spirit, the Chinese will try 
to synthesize the constituent parts into a whole so that all 
parts blend into a harmonious relationship at this higher 
level of perceptual organization" (Yang, 1986, p. 148). 
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For these reasons, The Chinese will adopt a holistic 
approach to negotiation and bargaining—a approach which is 
regarded as central to effective and successful negotiation, 
even in Western literature. As Graham and Herberger (1983) 
have noted: 
Americans usually attack a complex negotiation 
task sequentially—that is, they separate the 
issues and settle them one at a time...thus, in an 
American negotiation, the final agreement is a sum 
of the several concessions made on individual 
issues, and progress can easily be measured.... In 
other countries, particularly Far Eastern 
cultures, however, concessions may come only at 
the end of a negotiation. All issues are 
discussed with a holistic approach—settling 
nothing until the end (p. 164). 
This holistic orientation also displays the 
characteristics of a polychronic time culture where time is 
considered as a sacred point rather than a ribbon or road 
and where people handle several things at one time. 
When it comes to final stage of the agreement, American 
negotiators have a natural tending to see the phase as the 
ending or termination of a discrete social interaction and 
relationship. The Chinese, however, under the influence of 
a collectivist framework and emphasizing personal 
relationship and guanxi, will not perceive the reading of an 
agreement as a final ending of a process. The relationship 
continues past the point of obtaining an agreement with a 
different perception then of the conclusion of a negotiation 
process. For Americans, Pye (1982) suggests, the whole 
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process is viewed with an expectation that an outcome will 
be accomplished and that adherence to an agreement will 
provide for a period of stable and predictable behavior. 
The Chinese do not see the process in discrete terms and 
will not view a formalized contract as the conclusion of the 
process. Critics on current business negotiations with 
China point out the different conceptions of agreements and 
contracts and the tendency of the Chinese to attempt to 
renegotiate the agreement even after it seems to have been 
formalized and the documents signed. 
This last point again reveals a very different 
orientation on the part of the Chinese: "For the Chinese the 
very achievement of a formalized agreement, like the initial 
agreement on principles, means that the two parties now 
understand each other well enough that each can expect 
further favors from the other" (Pye, 1982, p. 79). Thus, 
American business people should be very careful in doing 
business with the Chinese. Even after the contract has been 
signed, they should be prepared that the Chinese will bring 
up issues not discussed previously. They should be always 
ready for new issues to occur. 
CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have identified some of the primary 
Chinese factors which have great influence on Chinese 
negotiation behavior and conflict-management preferences. 
Based on the cultural factors and Chinese negotiation 
behavior, I offer the following recommendations for American 
business people conducting negotiations in China. 
Preparing for Negotiations 
In preparing for negotiations with the Chinese, I 
recommend that Americans do the following: 
1. Prepare an agenda for training and preparations; 
include a special training program on American and 
Chinese negotiating style. 
2. Consider as many potential problems as possible 
and prepare written procedures to solve them; 
write as much on paper as possible. 
3. Select negotiators whose style will be more acceptable 
to the Chinese — that is, more restrained. 
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4. Select senior negotiators with high status to start 
negotiations with the Chinese. 
5. Choose interpreters familiar with both American and 
Chinese culture as well as the business in question. 
6. Know who the Chinese negotiators and authorities are. 
Associate with the Chinese negotiators and the 
authorities before the actual negotiation begins or 
during the course of negotiation. Talk to them during 
informal interactions. 
7. Develop personal relationships with the Chinese 
negotiators early in the negotiation process. Treat 
them as equals and friends, not as inferiors. 
Carrying out the Negotiations 
In carrying out negotiations with the Chinese, I 
recommend that Americans do the following: 
1. Prepare initial written objectives with a set of 
specific goals for doing business in China. 
2. Accept the Chinese offer of friendship in the 
spirit in which it is extended. The relationship can 
have practical and materialistic dimensions as well as 
a sentimental dimension. 
3. Emphasize the strategic, long-range process of 
negotiation and the gradual accumulation of mutual 
trust. 
4. Accentuate the similarities rather than the 
differences between the two parties' bargaining 
positions when beginning the negotiations. 
5. Plan for long negotiation sessions and allow for 
frequent recesses for private consultation by the 
negotiation teams. Do not set a deadline for 
conducting negotiations. Expect continuous 
delays. 
6. Prepare for misunderstandings and avoid open 
confrontation and conflicts in negotiations with the 
Chinese. 
7. Avoid aggressive behavior and practice patience. 
8. Minimize expressions of emotion, and instead be 
politely formal. 
9. Recognize that nonverbal gestures are as important 
as explicit language. Watch out for your nonverbal 
behaviors as well as that of the Chinese. Your 
nonverbal behavior will be read carefully by the 
Chinese, and the nonverbal behavior of the Chinese may 
contain symbolic meanings as well. 
10. Remember that behavior outside negotiations is as 
important as behaviors during the formal process of 
negotiation. 
11. Address the group as a whole, and do not attempt to 
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convince the Chinese to accept a position because it 
will bring one or more of them personal gain. 
Concluding the Negotiation 
In concluding negotiations with the Chinese, I 
recommend that Americans do the following: 
1. Before offering or accepting concessions, 
carefully weigh the short-term benefits versus the 
long-term debts the concessions will cause a party 
to incur. 
2. Accept that you cannot define or govern your 
Chinese company with any formal contract. Learn to 
shape it through the human relationships 
established through the negotiations and the 
actual conduct of business. 
3. Be willing to forego some advantages and details so 
that a lasting mutual attraction may develop. 
4. When negotiations approach the final stage, allow 
for a short delay before concluding them. This time 
frame will enable the Chinese to make decisions behind 
the scene. 
5. At the successful conclusion of the negotiations, 
show your appreciation to the Chinese that the 
outcome of negotiation is to the satisfaction of both 
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sides. 
6. Expect that new issues will occur and the Chinese 
will bring up new issues even after the contract has 
been signed. 
Conclusion 
This writer attempts to explore the cultural and 
psychological origins of Chinese conflict management and 
resolution preferences. The cultural values and cognitive 
styles forms only two of the many factors which influence 
conflict behavior (others include resource scarcities, 
position power, and environmental constraints). However, 
these cultural and psychological factors are major 
determining influences which need to be understood in order 
to facilitate cross-cultural conflict resolution. 
The paper also attempts to show how a distinctive 
Chinese negotiating and bargaining style can be traced back 
to conflict management preferences and more general cultural 
positions. 
In this study I attempted to approach the subject of 
Sino-American business negotiation from a new perspective--
a combination of the studies of national negotiation style 
and the conceptual theoretical analysis. I developed my 
study on Thomas's theory of conflict management style, and 
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analyze the Chinese conflict management resolutions to the 
extent that Chinese negotiators generally prefer 
compromising and avoiding style due to the influence of 
traditional Chinese cultural factors and values. Nine 
cultural values have been discussed, and applications have 
been made to the specific negotiation stages. 
Nevertheless, this paper, based on library research, 
has its limitations. Further studies to this area should 
come from the use of experimental simulations in both intra-
cultural and intercultural settings. However, only by 
pursuing the naturalistic observation of actual conflict and 
negotiating behaviors in both intra-cultural and inter-
cultural settings can we fully establish the extent and form 
of cross-cultural differences. 
Finally, it is important to note that this study has 
focused exclusively on conflict-management preferences and 
not upon the dynamics of the conflict process. Yet, the 
processual dynamics of conflict episodes are as open to 
cultural influences as are initial preferences for 
resolution mechanisms. Thus, much further study should be 
conducted in this important field. 
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